逃离黑格尔（二）
本篇文章由我翻译，全文共26页，本篇为节选的第二部分约4.5页内容，原文为英文并附于末尾，红色标注为原文附带的注释，蓝色标注为我添加的补充和注释。文章中引用部分若已有汉译本，则一概使用汉译本的翻译，并补充标注汉译本的引用文献。由于专栏编辑器中不能设置斜体，我用加粗来代替斜体。 为了方便，我会在正文中加入页码，表示方法如【288】。
三、对“辩证法”中神秘性的部分揭示
我在前文已经讲到过，从马克思与黑格尔文本的形式相似性到他们遵循着相同“方法”的推导不仅是无效的，而且是一个“严重的错误”。【290】我之所以这么认为的原因非常简单，黑格尔文本中最典型的论证方式显然且确实是似是而非的。主张马克思系统性地运用这些论证风格——以及/或者主张马克思即使在某些情况下并没有这样做，他也“打算”或应当这么做——就等同于主张将他的经济分析在同样似是而非的逻辑基础上重构。我在这里只提出一个如此显然的问题，而我在这里也对这一问题给出一个简略的回答：即，黑格尔主义“辩证法”究竟是什么？[8] 与其他论证方式相比，“黑格尔主义”论证方式究竟有何特别之处？首先，我们需要承认的是，黑格尔的叙述实际上并不遵循任何一个统一的论证方式，相反，它展现的是各种各样的论证策略。这就是为什么我在这里用复数形式来表述这些黑格尔主义论证“风格”("styles")。因此，黑格尔自称他所遵循的“方法”——或者更准确地说，作为他所主张的“绝对形式”，他应当“使自己的论证方式接近于其”的这种“方法”——与论证中实际遵循的“方法”之间时常存在着不一致。尽管如此，我们依然从“辩证法”自身的主张出发开始对其进行简要考察。
如果说黑格尔所说的“辩证”叙述有什么鲜明特征的话，那大概就是它发展的内在性。尽管（正如黑格尔所说）“判断形式”被运用在叙述中，但可以这么说，论证过程中的节点并非判断，而是概念或“规定”(Bestimmungen)，不能仅仅把某一组判断当作给定条件，并从它们推导出其他的判断。任何给定的概念或“规定”，如果孤立地考虑的话，都应当揭示出其自身是内在矛盾的，因此对于它自己的概念把握活动(comprehension)，就需要使其“过渡”到另一个概念，在这个新概念中，它内在的矛盾得到解决或“扬弃”(“aufgehoben”)。只要下一个概念或“规定”依然只是局部的概念或“规定”，即“有限者”的规定，【291】它就必须表明自己也是内在不稳定的，因此也需要继续“过渡”到另一个概念或“规定”。这一过程不断发生：直到抵达总体(totality)概念，而先前的所有规定最终都被表明其是总体中的各个方面或“因素”，从而代表了它们的“真理”。这种概念的发展应当直接发生，不需要引用任何无关的质料或考察来推动这种“过渡”，而且无论如何，对于黑格尔而言——如果不是对所有黑格尔主义者而言的话——无论它以何种“局部规定”出现，都不应该在整体(the whole)概念之前止步：这个整体概念就是“一般”，即前文所指出的第一个意义上，“真实的无限者”，其中的每个局部规定都仅仅只是从属于“一般”的因素。
对局部“规定”的所谓“矛盾”性还有必要进一步说明一下。尽管黑格尔马克思主义者并未坚持这一点，但在黑格尔看来，“规定”的“矛盾”性意味着在经过仔细考察后，它会趋向于与对立的“规定”相融合(collapse)（顺带说一句，这已经有一些奇怪了，因为每个概念都有一个对立者这一点并不显然）。因此，“矛盾的对立者”("contradictory opposites")，仅仅就它们作为特定的概念而言，在不断地相互“过渡”，而真正的发展新阶段只从向第三个概念过渡开始，在这个新概念中，它们的矛盾得到了解决，并因此表现为“（上述）对立者的统一体”["unity of (said) opposites"]。
现在，黑格尔的叙述真的表现出像我们刚才描述的那种方法(modus operandi)了吗？好吧，简而言之，在《逻辑学》的最开始，摆在我们面前的就是那些最抽象的“规定”（即“摆在我们面前的需要思考的东西”），这些规定被假定为推动了整个过程——而且实际上也的确如此。在证明抽象存在与抽象虚无(abstract nothingness)的概念实际上是无法相互区分的这一点上，以及在揭示这些“所谓的”(vermeint)对立者的同一性这一点上，黑格尔的“辩证法”达到了它的最佳境界。但是，当尝试“过渡到”一个代表着它们的“统一体”的概念时，黑格尔的论证还是在某种程度上已经被它的包容性(capaciousness)所破坏，而尽管有着明确的意图，但我还是认为这种包容性在他的整体叙述中的越来越明显。我们暂且不进一步研究具体细节，只是在这里简单说一下，黑格尔实际上一直提出作为“存在和无的统一体”(the "unity of being and nothing")的两个候选者也只不过是这种包容性的代表性特征（症候）：【292】首先是转变(becoming)，接着是所谓的“定在”("determinate being")或Dasein（即德文的“定在”）？[9]
在这之后，在黑格尔叙述的后续发展中，在《逻辑学》的其余章节和整个有关自然和“精神”的更“具体的科学”中，就几乎再也没有听到过黑格尔所承诺的内在“辩证法”了。首先，黑格尔的论证在很多地方上甚至根本连表面上的内在性都没有，而是表现出了相当明目张胆的目的论特征。在这种情况下，“过渡”并不是由所考察的概念自身的任何内在“矛盾”所推动的，而是由根据所谓（黑格尔主义）“三段论”预先构造的标准来判断的后者的所谓不足性(inadequacy)所推动的。后者的要旨与任何传统逻辑意义上的三段论几乎没有任何关系，而是对于任何给定的“普遍”或“概念”，普遍只能在区别于自身的特殊领域下才能取得实质上的实在性或“现实性”(Wirklichkeit)；然而，由于它们的特殊性恰恰在于它们与它们的“概念”在某些方面相背离，因此后者必须反过来表明它们真的服从于后者，因此它们仅仅在表面上才具有的独立性(Selbständigkeit)就被否定了。既然“一般”的目标正是以所描述的方式取得实质上的实在性，从而在它的“另一种存在”("other being")本身中“认识它自己”（如果这没有多大意义的话，非黑格尔主义者们也不应当对此感到沮丧），因此上述的普遍就必须区别于它自己，并反过来扬弃那些仅仅是设定出来的区别。此外，通过证明杂多东西(manifold)的元素（“一般”之前已将这些元素与它自身相区别）“本质上”只不过是它的许多从属“因素”或作用，“一般”证明了它自己就是赋予这些元素以它们的统一体的力量，从而将它们转化为现存“个别”的器官(organs)。因此，黑格尔三段论的“一般图式”("general schema")就是"U-P-I"，代表了“普遍性”("universality")、“特殊性”("particularity")和“个别性”("individuality")——在德语中就是"A-B-E"，代表了"Allgemeinheit"、"Besonderheit"和"Einzelheit"。【293】黑格尔沿着这条道路所构建的论证不胜枚举。例如，在《法哲学原理》中，这种向不法(Unrecht)概念的过渡出于“逻辑上更高的必然性，根据这个必然性，概念的各个环节——在这里是法权(Recht)的原则或作为普遍物的意志，以及实存中的法（这个实存就是意志的特殊性）——被设定为就其自身而言不同的东西……”（§81, 附释）（参见Rosenthal, 1991; 1998, 103-6）(17)从“逻辑”("logic")到“自然”("nature")、从“自在的”“理念”("idea" "in itself")到外在的“理念”("idea" in its externality)的主要的系统性过渡，呈现出完全相同的结构。
其次，黑格尔的叙述确实至少表面上坚持了遵循内在发展过程的原则，就像在《逻辑学》中所表现的那样，并且在这一体系的之后阶段中表现得越来越少，我认为，推动它从一个“规定”转向下一个“规定”的实际动力并非上面所描述的自我超越(18)的矛盾，而是（如分析哲学家们通常所主张的）相当无趣的双关语的使用。也就是说，黑格尔无情地利用了他话语中所有可能的歧义。实际上，他系统性地利用了一组引人注目又紧密相连的歧义，这些歧义建立在“概念”的三个基本“环节”上，而这些“环节”为他的整个叙述提供了框架。正如已经指出的，Allgemeinheit在包罗万象的含义和相对更具包容性的含义之间[“普遍性”("universality")和“一般性”("generality")(19)之间]存在着系统性的歧义；Besonderheit在绝对独特性(the absolutely unique)的含义、独特性(the sui generis)的含义以及相对更确定性的含义之间[“独特性”("particularity")，即所谓的“单纯性”("bare")、特殊性(particularity)和“特定性”("specificity")之间]存在着系统性的歧义；以及最后，Einzelheit在绝对唯一或完全确定的元素的含义(the absolutely unique or fully determinate element)和完全确定或包罗万象的体系的含义之间[单纯的特殊性或“个别性”和普遍性或“总体”之间](between bare particularity or "individuality" and universality or "totality")存在着系统性的歧义。因此，实际上，在黑格尔的话语中，Allgemeinheit和Besonderheit共同拥有着有限一般性(limited generality)或换句话说，特定性的内涵；Besonderheit和Einzelheit则共同拥有着独特性或“单个性”(the sui generis or "singular")的内涵；而Einzelheit和Allgemeinheit则共同拥有着包含着它的所有规定的总体或“真实的无限者”的内涵。在以上所指出的三个基本混淆中，第二个混淆，即特定性与特殊性的混淆所造成的后果最为严重——实际上，它明显是黑格尔唯心主义所导致的结果——【294】它使得黑格尔能够从一个关于概念规定性(determinacy)的合理的出发点（例如，后者是由系统性差别与——至少存在于某些特定种类(classes)的概念中的——对立所引起的）轻易地倒向一个关于事物已规定的实存(determinate existence)的非常荒谬的结论（例如，“一切事物自在地就是自相矛盾的”）。尽管它引起的这一系列令人眼花缭乱的逻辑谬误太过于复杂，以至于无法在这里一一叙述，但我认为，黑格尔的论证中最典型的就是这种独特的论证方式——在论证前预设结论(petitio)，也就是说，他的叙述似乎是建立在论证之上的（见Rosenthal, 1998, ch.10,尤其是125-8）。
注释：
[8] 更多细节请见Rosenthal 1998, part II, on "'Dialectical' Contradiction and the Logicization of the Empirical."
[9] 当然，黑格尔意识到了他的论述在这一方面上的独特性，并试图以某种方式勉强为其辩护。对于那些在训诂学上试图为黑格尔辩护的人来说，这里是他本人的“解释”（即他在所谓的“小”或“百科全书”《逻辑学》中所做出的解释）：“转变(becoming)中与无(nothing)为一体(one)的存在(being)，就像与存在为一体的无一样，都只是转瞬即逝的(transitory)。转变由于其内在的矛盾，融合为两者/两个[规定]皆被扬弃的统一体。由此所得的结果就是定在(being-there, determinate being)。”（Hegel, 1986, §89; 该段由本文作者翻译）（但参考文献并未给出Hegel, 1986，它可能是《哲学科学全书纲要》的英文版，但我未能找到这一版，也可能是单纯的标注错误；我翻译的这段中文译文同时参照了薛华译的《小逻辑》、贺麟译的《小逻辑》、先刚译的《大逻辑》、作者翻译的英文和英文版《小逻辑》；中括号中的“[规定]”一词为作者本人的补充；“转瞬即逝的”一句为我根据作者的翻译进行的翻译，英文版对应的译文为“消逝着的[东西]”("vanishing [terms]")；最后的“定在”一词，作者翻译为"determinate being"，而英文版为"being-there"）
译者注：
(17) 此处译文参照了邓安庆译本和范扬、张企泰译本的《法哲学原理》，译文根据罗森塔尔的翻译进行了改动。
(18) “超越”(transcend)一词在英语语境下，时常是作为“扬弃”(Aufhebung)一词的同义词而使用的。
(19) 此处的“一般性”("generality")不同于之前的“一般”("the" universal)（比如我在译者注(10)中所提及的“一般性”，但接近于译者注(9)中所提及的“一般”），正如罗森塔尔所指出的那样，这里的“一般性”指的是某种类似“概括性”的概念，例如马克思在《政治经济学导言》中所提到的“生产一般”("Production in general"、"Production im Allgemeinen")和“劳动一般”("labour as such"、"Arbeit überhaupt")（请参见《马克思恩格斯全集》中文第二版第30卷第26、46页中的叙述），“生产一般”是对所有生产共同特征的概括，它相对某种具体的生产而言，例如资本主义生产，更具包容性，“劳动一般”也是同样，相对于各种各样的劳动比如耕种、纺织，劳动一般是对所有种类劳动的概括；而之前的“一般”("the" universal)则是某种比“普遍”更高的东西，也就是我在译者注(11)中所指出的“精神”，它包罗万象。我在这里举一个例子（这一例子来自伊利因科夫），我们可以从足球、火星、轴承中概括出“圆”这一概念，我们叫它“圆一般”，“圆一般”就是足球、火星、轴承的“概括”，但显然，我们不可能从“圆一般”出发，运用逻辑推导出足球、火星、轴承的存在，因为“圆一般”反映的仅仅只是足球、火星、轴承的共同特征；但我们可以从某种“一般性”或“普遍性”出发，运用黑格尔的图式"U-P-I"，从中推导出足球、火星、轴承的存在，因为“一般性”或“普遍性”是包罗万象的。在后文中，在可能引起歧义的时候，我会补充“一般性”所对应的原文。而"Allgemeinen"、"Allgemeineheit"对应的英文可以是"universal"、"universality"，也可以是"general"、"generality"，所以罗森塔尔说"Allgemeineheit"是有歧义的。
参考文献
Arthur, Christopher J. 1991. Review Article. Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britaim 23/24, 79-90.
--------. 1993. "Hegel’s Logic and Marx’s Capital." In Fred Moseley, ed., Marx’s Method in Capital: A Re-examination. Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: Humanities Press.
Backhaus, Hans-Georg. 1997. Dialektik der Wertform. Freiburg: Ça ira Verlag.
Banaji, Jairus. 1979. "From the Commodity to Capital: Hegel's Dialectic in Marx's Capital. "In Diane Elson, ed., Value: The Representation of Labour in Capitalism. London: CSE Books.
Brentel, Helmut. 1989. Soziale Form und Ökonomisches Objekt: Studien zum Gegenstandsund Methodenverständnis der Kritik der politischen Ökonomie. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.
Eldred, M. and M. Hanion. 1981. "Reconstructing Value-Form Analysis." Capital and Class, 13 (Spring), 24-60.
Hegel, G. W. F. 1969. The Science of Logic. Trans. A. V. Miller. London: Allen & Unwin.
--------. 1970. Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften, Erster Teil. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
Marx, Karl. 1970. A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy. New York: International.
--------. 1973. Grundrisse. Middlesex: Penguin.
--------. 1975. Texts on Method, ed. Terrel Carver. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
--------. 1976. Capital, Vol. I. Middlesex: Penguin.
Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe. 1972-. Berlin: Die tz Verlag.
Marx-Engels Werke. 1956-. Berlin: Dietz Verlag.
Petry, Franz. 1916. Der soziale Gehalt derMarxschen Werttheorie. Jena: Verlag von Gustav Fischer.
Rosenthal, John. 1991. "Freedom's Devices: The Place of the Individual in Hegel's Philosophy of Right." Radical Philosophy, 59, 27-32.
--------. 1993. "A Transcendental Deduction of the Categories without the Categories." International Philosophical Quarterly, XXXIII: 4, 449-64.
--------. 1998. The Myth of Dialectics: Re-interpreting the Marx-Hegel Relation. New York: St. Martins.
Schweickart, David. 1988. "Reflections on Anti-Marxism: Elster on Marx's Functionalism and Labor Theory of Value." Praxis International, 8:1, 109-22.
Shamsavari, Ali. 1991 . Dialectics and Sodai Theory: The Logic o/Capital. London: Merlin.
Smith, Tony. 1990. The Logic of Marx's Capital. Albany, New York: State University of New York Press.
The Mysteries of "Dialectics" Somewhat Revealed
I said above that the inference from the formal similitude of the Marxian and Hegelian discourses to the commonality of the "method" that they obey is not only invalid, but constitutes a "grave error." The reason I consider this error to be grave is quite simply that the patterns of argumentation most characteristic of Hegel's exposition are demonstrably and indeed wildly specious. To insist that Marx systematically employed the same styles of argumentation - and/or that, even when on some occasion he did not, he "meant to" or should have - is to insist on a reconstruction of his economic analyses that places them all in principle on a similarly unsound logical basis. My claim here raises an obvious question, to which I can only in the present context give the most schematic of responses: viz., just what exactly are Hegelian "dialectics"? [8] What is especially distinctive about a "Hegelian" mode of argumentation as opposed to any other? Well, in the first place, it needs to be acknowledged that in practice Hegel's exposition does not follow any one unified canon of argumentation, but, on the contrary, exhibits a variety of argumentational strategies. This is why I have written here of Hegelian "styles" of argumentation, in the plural. Hence, there is frequently a discrepancy between the "method" that Hegel says his exposition is supposed to follow - or indeed that as "absolute form," he claims, is supposed to "develop itself" into that exposition - and what in fact takes place in it. Nonetheless, let us start our brief survey of "dialectics" with the self-image.
If there is anything conspicuously distinctive about a "dialectical" exposition as Hegel says it is supposed to proceed, it is precisely the immanence of its development. Though (as Hegel would put it) the "form of judgment" will be employed in the exposition, the, so to speak, nodal points of the progression are not judgments, some set of which would have simply to be taken as given in order for others to be inferred from them, but rather concepts or "determinations" (Bestimmungen). Any given concept or "determination," considered in isolation, is supposed to reveal itself as internally contradictory and hence to require for its own comprehension the "transition" into another concept in which the contradiction inherent in it is resolved or "aufgehoben." So long as this next concept or "determination" is likewise a merely partial one, viz. a determination of "finitude," it too must prove inherently unstable and hence demand the "transition" into yet another. And so on: until, namely, the concept of that totality is reached of which all the prior determinations are finally revealed to have been aspects or "moments" and which thus represents their "truth." This conceptual progression should proceed apace without any extraneous materials or considerations having to be simply adduced in order to motivate a "transition," and for Hegel at any rate, if not for all Hegelians, no matter with what "partial determination" it is engaged, it should not be able to stop short of the concept of the whole: which is to say, again, the "universal," viz. in the first sense indicated above, the "true infinite" of which every merely partial determination is a subordinate moment.
One further remark has to be made here as regards the allegedly "contradictory" character of the merely partial "determinations." Though Hegelian Marxists have not insisted upon this point, in Hegel the "contradictory" character of a "determination" is supposed to imply that upon careful consideration it tends literally to collapse into the opposite "determination" (which is already a bit odd, incidentally, since it is by no means obvious that every concept even has a contrary). The "contradictory opposites" are thus, simply qua the specific concepts that they are, in continual "transition" into one another, and the really new phase in the progression only begins with the transition to a third concept in which their contradiction is resolved and which thus represents the "unity of (said) opposites."
Now, does Hegel's exposition in fact exhibit a modus operandi such as that just described? Well, ever so briefly, at the very outset of the Logic, in presenting the most abstract "determinations" (just what is "there before us to be thought") which are supposed to set the entire progression in motion - indeed it does. In demonstrating that the concepts of abstract being and abstract nothingness are in fact indistinguishable from one another, in exposing the identity of these merely "supposed" (vermeint) opposites, Hegel's "dialectic" is at its best. Already, however, with the attempted "transition" to a concept representing their "unity," Hegel's argumentation, as it were, is marred by the capaciousness which, despite stated intentions, becomes, I will suggest, increasingly characteristic of his presentation as a whole. Without going into further details, it is alone symptomatic of such capriciousness that Hegel in fact persistently nominates two candidates to serve as the "unity of being and nothing": first, becoming, and then so-called "determinate being" or Dasein? [9]
Thereafter, in the subsequent development of Hegel's exposition, through the remainder of the Logic and throughout the more "concrete sciences" of nature and "spirit," the promised immanent "dialectic" is barely to be heard from again. In the first place, so much of Hegel's argumentation is not even just ostensibly immanent at all, but rather quite brazenly teleological in character. In such cases, the "transitions" are not motivated by any intrinsic "contradictoriness" of the concepts themselves under consideration, but rather by the alleged inadequacy of the latter as judged by the preconstructed standard of the so-called (Hegelian) "syllogism." The gist of the latter, which has precious little to do with syllogisms in any traditional logical sense of the term, is that for any given "universal" or "concept" that universal can only acquire substantial reality or "actuality" (Wirklichkeit) on the condition of differentiating from itself a domain of particulars; which latter, however, inasmuch as their particularity will consist precisely in their diverging in some respects from their "concept," must in turn be shown to be really subordinated to the latter, and their merely apparent independence (Selbständigkeit) thereby negated. Since it is precisely the aim of "the" universal to acquire substantial reality in the manner described and thus to "know itself in its "other being" as such (non-Hegelians should not be dismayed if this does not make much sense), hence said universal must indeed differentiate itself and sublate in turn the merely "posited" difference. Through the demonstration, moreover, that the elements of the manifold which the "universal" has previously differentiated from itself are "in essence" just so many subordinate "moments" or functions of it, the "universal" proves itself to be the power that lends to such elements their unity and thus converts them into the organs of an existing "individual." Hence, Hegel's "general schema" of the syllogism is "U-P-I" for "universality," "particularity," and "individuality" - or, in the original German, "A-R-E" for "Allgemeinheit" "Besonderheit? and "Einzelheit." The examples of arguments constructed along these lines in Hegel are legion. For instance, in the Philosophy of Right, the transition to the category of wrong (Unrecht) is made by appeal to the "logical higher necessity that the moments of the concept - here the principle of right (Recht) or the will as universal, and right in its real existence, which is just the particularity of the will - should be posited as explicitly different . . ." (§81, addition) (cf. Rosenthal, 1991; 1998, 103- 6). The major systemic transition from "logic" to "nature," from the "idea" "in itself to the "idea" in its externality, exhibits exactly the same structure.
Second, where Hegel's exposition does at least maintain the appearance of following an immanent course of development, as is largely still the case in the Logic and less and less so in the subsequent stages of the system, I would suggest that the actual motor that drives it on from one "determination" to the next is not the dynamic of self-transcending contradiction adumbrated above, but rather (as analytical philosophers have indeed typically contended) quite pedestrian pun-making. This is to say that Hegel ruthlessly exploits every possible ambiguity in the terms of his discourse. Indeed, he systematically exploits a remarkable set of interlocking ambiguities which are built in to the three basic "moments" of the "concept" that provide the architecture for his entire exposition. Allgemeinheit, as already noted, is systematically ambiguous between the sense of the all-inclusive and that of the relatively more inclusive (between "universality" and "generality"); Besonderheit is systematically ambiguous between the sense of the absolutely unique, the sui generis, and that of the relatively more determinate (between "particularity," i.e., so-called "bar? particularity, and "specificity"); and Einzelheit, finally, is systematically ambiguous between the sense of the absolutely unique or fully determinate element and that of the fully determinate or all-inclusive system (between bare particularity or "individuality" and universality or "totality"). Thus, in effect, in Hegelian discourse, Allgemeinheit and Besonderheit share the connotation of a limited generality or, in other words, specificity; Besonderheit and Einzelheit share the connotation of the sui generis or "singular"; and Einzelheit and Allgemeinhdt share the connotation of a totality inclusive of all its determinations or "true infinity." Of the three elementary conflations indicated above, it is the second, that of specificity and particularity, which is the most fraught with consequences - and indeed manifestly idealist consequences at that - as it permits Hegel to slide effortlessly from claims that are quite legitimate as concerns the determinacy of concepts (for example, that the latter is a function of systematic differences and, at least in the case of certain special classes of concepts, opposition) to quite preposterous conclusions concerning the determinate existence of things (for instance, that "everything is in itself contradictory") . Though the dizzying series of paralogisms to which it gives rise in practice are far too convoluted to be gone into here, it is this distinctive petitio which is, I would suggest, the most characteristic tendency of Hegel's argumentation, i.e., to the extent that his exposition even appears to depend upon arguments (see Rosenthal, 1998, ch.10, esp. 125-8).
8 For the details, see Rosenthal 1998, part II, on "'Dialectical' Contradiction and the Logicization of the Empirical."
9 Of course, Hegel is aware of the peculiarity of his exposition in this respect and tries, after a fashion, to justify it. For those of hermeneutically charitable impulses, here is his "explanation" (viz. in the form in which it appears in the so-called "lesser" or "Encyclopedia" Logic): "Being in becoming as one with nothing, just as nothing as one with being, are merely transitory. Becoming, through its intrinsic contradiction, collapses into the unity in which both [determinations] are sublated. Its result is thereby determinate being" (Hegel, 1986, §89; author's translation).
